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PERSPECTIVE

Recognizing Conscience in Abortion Provision

guishing claims of conscience
from other types of claims. Certainly, if abortion providers’
conscience-based claims require
scrutiny, so do conscience-based
refusals, to ensure that refusals
are indeed motivated by conscience
and not by political beliefs, stigma,
habit, erroneous understanding of
medical evidence, or other factors.
Despite nearly four decades of
debate about conscientious refusals, we have no clear path for operationalizing them — no standard curriculum to teach health
care professionals how to humanely conscientiously object, and
no clinical standard of care for
conscientious refusals — although
there are presumably good and
bad, skillful and haphazard, safe
and unsafe ways of carrying

them out. Since we need both a
standard curriculum and a standard of care, it is perhaps premature to introduce a whole new set
of conscience claims. The terms
used in the current debate, however, are inadequate and inac
curate.
Recognizing only negative
claims of conscience with respect
to abortion — or any care — is a
kind of hemineglect. Health care
workers with conflicting views
about contested medical procedures might all be “conscientious,”
even though their core beliefs
vary. Failure to recognize that
conscience compels abortion provision, just as it compels refusals
to offer abortion care, renders
“conscience” an empty concept
and leaves us all with no moral

ground (high or low) on which
to stand.
Disclosure forms provided by the author
are available with the full text of this article
at NEJM.org.
From the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, the Department of Women’s
Studies, the Center for Bioethics and Social
Sciences in Medicine, and the Program for
Sexual Rights and Reproductive Justice,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
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P

erhaps the biggest of the
many surprises found in the
Supreme Court’s June 28 decision on the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) was the Court’s conclusion
that the law’s Medicaid expansion scheduled for 2014 was unconstitutional.1 Attention before
June 28 was focused on whether
the Court would uphold the individual mandate to obtain health
insurance coverage, but in the
wake of the Court’s decision, focus has shifted to the question of
whether states will refuse to participate in expanding the Medicaid program, given the Court’s
holding that the Secretary of
Health and Human Services
cannot enforce the expansion as a
mandate.
Sommers et al. now provide in

the Journal (pages 1025–1034) a
glimpse of the impact of Medicaid expansion in New York, Maine,
and Arizona. Medicaid expansion
in these states was associated not
only with improved health care
coverage but also with reduced
mortality. The question of whether
the states will expand Medicaid,
therefore, is not just a question of
politics; it is a question of life,
health, and death.
The expansion is one of several
important Medicaid changes in
the ACA. But as Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg noted in her opinion,
changes in Medicaid are not new.
Medicaid itself was established in
1965 as an amendment to the preexisting Medical Assistance for the
Aged program. Since then, Congress has amended Medicaid at
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least 50 times, mandating coverage of new categories of beneficiaries (e.g., low-income pregnant
women in 1988) and dramatically
expanding coverage for others
(e.g., low-income children in 1989).
Indeed, the Social Security Act has
always reserved to Congress “the
right to alter, amend, or repeal any
provision” of the Medicaid statute.2 The ACA’s expansion of Medicaid to cover all nonelderly lowincome persons with household
incomes below 138% of the federal poverty level was the latest in
a long line of evolutionary program reforms.
The 26 state challengers
claimed that the ACA Medicaid
amendments crossed a constitutional line. It is clear that Congress cannot force states to par-
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ticipate in a federal program. The
Court has long recognized, however, that the federal government
can offer funding to the states
conditional on their satisfying
program requirements. The Court
had speculated in earlier cases
that a situation could arise in
which “the financial inducement
offered by Congress” was so coercive that “pressure turns into compulsion.” But no federal court had
ever held that a federal law failed
this test, and the lower courts rejected the states’ Medicaid claims.
Chief Justice John Roberts,
joined by Justices Stephen Breyer
and Elena Kagan and supported
by a joint dissent from Justices
Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, held that the ACA Medicaid expansion crossed this line.
The Court claimed, moreover,
that this “coercion” doctrine is
fundamental to federalism and
that brandishing federal funding
to coerce states to participate in
federal programs threatens the
states’ independent sovereignty.
Because the Medicaid expansion was established as a mandate, not an option, Medicaid law
would allow the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS)
to threaten to withhold all Medicaid payments from states not
adopting it — a penalty that HHS
has never imposed. In this case,
however, the Court held that such
a response was impermissible.
Withdrawal of program funding
would amount to unconstitutional
coercion, given the program’s size
and the nature of the expansion.
On average, Medicaid accounts
for more than 20% of total state
budgets and represents the largest single source of federal funding to the states. Furthermore,
said Roberts, the ACA Medicaid

984

expansion changed Medicaid fundamentally. Medicaid, he claimed,
“is no longer a program to care
for the neediest among us, but
rather an element of a comprehensive national plan to provide
universal health insurance coverage.” Congress could not constitutionally force the states to implement a new program under the
threat of losing existing program
funding.
Having found the Medicaid expansion unconstitutional, however,
the Court did not strike the expan
sion, as the dissenters wanted. Instead, it simply prevented HHS
from enforcing the expansion as a
mandate. The practical effect is to
turn it into an option, although
the law remains on the books
unchanged. At the same time,
the Court made clear that Congress has the power to delineate
the conditions under which the
states can receive new expansion
funding.
The Court’s decision raises
three key questions. First, which
ACA Medicaid reforms are affected? The ACA makes many changes
in the Medicaid program. In particular, the law contains a maintenance-of-effort provision barring
states from rolling back Medicaid
coverage until their health insurance exchanges are operational.
It also requires other changes in
coverage and enrollment. The
states challenged ACA reforms
beyond the expansion of eligibility, including the maintenance-ofeffort requirement.3 But Roberts’s
opinion focuses only on the expansion group, never mentioning
the other reforms; presumably the
Court considered them part of
the existing program, subject to
the program’s normal enforcement
tool for mandatory provisions. A
July 10 letter from HHS Secretary
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Kathleen Sebelius makes clear
that where Medicaid is concerned,
the Roberts ruling is confined to
newly eligible adults.4
Second, how far does the
Court’s new coercion doctrine go?
The federal government conditions participation in many cooperative programs on state compliance with federal requirements.
These joint efforts include not
just health and social welfare
programs but education, environmental, civil rights, and transportation programs. Are they all at
risk of litigation? Have states
now been given a vested right in
the status quo? Roberts seemed
particularly focused on the notion that the Medicaid expansion changes the program in
“kind,” not merely “degree,” and
on Medicaid’s size. How big is
big? Can a federal program be
too big to change? And when
does a program change in kind
and not degree? It is hard to find
limiting principles of the Court’s
holding.
Finally, how will the states respond? Several Republican governors have made a show of their
adamant refusal to expand their
Medicaid programs. But the Medicaid expansions are accompanied
by 100% federal funding for the
first 3 years, phasing down to
90% by 2020. The ACA offers no
other means for covering adults
with incomes below 100% of the
poverty level. Resisting states effectively intensify the huge uncompensated care burden faced
by their hospitals, deprive other
health care industry players of
important revenues, and keep
their medically underserved communities from receiving an enormous economic infusion. Indeed,
there is good evidence that overall, the changes in Medicaid will
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save, rather than cost, money.5
And residents of states that do
not expand will still be paying
federal taxes to cover the expansion in states that do expand.
Given the clear language of the
Court’s decision, the July 10 letter
permits states to decide whether
to accept funding to support the
Medicaid expansion for newly eligible adults as a group or to reject it and with it hundreds of
billions of dollars in much-needed
federal assistance. But some states
may press the administration to
interpret the expansion as a simple state option, allowing them to
cover some portion of the expansion group and not others. This
approach has no support in the
law and would invite states to leave

the most vulnerable members of
the expansion group — adults
without children — exposed to
the worst sort of discriminatory
exclusion. The administration may
be pressured to enter into negotiations with each state, using its
waiver authority. The ACA specifically amended the Medicaid
waiver process to ensure that it
was used for genuine research,
not political horse trading. One
can only hope that the states will
come to their senses and we all
will be spared the spectacle of
federal and state governments
struggling over the lives and
health of the poorest among us.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors
are available with the full text of this article
at NEJM.org.
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Tattoo Ink–Related Infections — Awareness, Diagnosis,
Reporting, and Prevention
Pamela M. LeBlanc, M.P.H., Katherine A. Hollinger, D.V.M., M.P.H., and Karl C. Klontz, M.D., M.P.H.
Related article, p. 1020

T

attoos have become increasingly popular in recent
years. In the United States, the
estimated percentage of adults
with one or more tattoos increased from 14% in 2008 to
21% in 2012.1 The process of
tattooing exposes the recipient
to risks of infections with various pathogens, some of which
are serious and difficult to treat.
Historically, the control of tattoo-associated dermatologic infections has focused on ensuring
safe tattooing practices and preventing contamination of ink at
the tattoo parlors — a regulatory
task overseen by state and local
authorities.2 In recent months,
however, reported outbreaks of
nontuberculous mycobacterial in-

fections associated with contaminated tattoo ink have raised
questions about the adequacy of
prevention efforts implemented at
the tattoo-parlor level alone. The
Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) is reaching out to health
care providers, public health officials, consumers, and the tattoo
industry to improve awareness, diagnosis, and reporting (through
the MedWatch program) in order
to develop more effective measures for tattoo ink–related public
health problems.
In late January 2012, the FDA
was notified, through MedWatch
adverse-event reports,3 of a cluster of patients in New York who
had contracted nontuberculous
mycobacterial infections manifest-
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ed by red papules on the gray-colored areas of recently acquired
tattoos (see photo and the article
by Kennedy and colleagues in
this issue of the Journal, pages
1020–1024). The FDA collaborated with local and state health
departments and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention to
investigate the outbreak. Efforts
to identify additional cases nationwide revealed that there were
other outbreaks of tattoo ink–
related nontuberculous mycobacterial infection that were associated with multiple brands of
ink, occurred in other states,
and involved multiple species of
mycobacteria (e.g., chelonae, fortuitum, and abscessus).
Previously published reports of
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